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(More customer reviews)A reader may be a bit disconcerted on first reading this book. There is much talk about "discourses" and "symbolism" and "ideology" and one might conclude that we are about to read a book of cultural studies on Francoist Spain. It is not so much that cultural studies are bad as that before we talk about perceptions of an event it might be a better idea to have a clear idea of what actually happened. As it happens such fears are groundless. What we have here is a brilliant portrait of the cruelty of Franco's regime. It is amazingly well documnted, with 95 pages of notes to 174 of text.
Richards argues that the ideology of the New State had two basic components. On the one hand the state had to purge Spain of the half of it who were secular, liberal, socialist, or regionalist. In a sense Franco's Spain would have to wage a permanent civil war against half of its own population. The other prong of the ideology was that Spain would follow a firm and ruthless policy of self-sufficiency. It has long been a cliche of much conservative and centrist discourse that notwithstanding the aid Franco got from the Axis, he should not be viewed as a fascist, but more as a classically "authoritarian" ruler, and therefore setting the stage for the properly pro-Western democracy that was to follow. Franco's goal were fundamentally traditional, as opposed to the radical ideology of the world's totalitarian regimes. Indeed, one could say the Nationalists were preferable to the Loyalists, who were now little more than Communist puppets. Such a thesis will soon appear next year when a book on that subject will be published by professional anti-communist Ronald Radosh. After reading this book, such complacent views will be placed firmly on the defensive.
For Richards starts with a chapter on the Francoist eliminiation of dissent. On the Loyalist side much of the violence was spontaneous in the aftermath of the breakdown of establish order in the wake of the coup. Juan Negrin, so often and so falsely dismissed as a Communist puppet, actually went of his way to patrol with militias in order to prevent political assasinations. On the nationalist side, by contrast, there was constant talk of extermination, liquidation, of an utterly uncompromising crusade from politicians who were proud of and not ashamed of the Spanish Inquisition. The Nazi press praised the Nationalists for their vigor: "The Marxist parties are being destroyed and exterminated down the very last cell far more dramatically even than here in Germany." Perhaps 6,000 were summarily executed in Seville alone before February 1937. (Richards adds "This was not violence which was `necessary' in any military sense: there was no organized armed resistance to speak of." ) In Granada perhaps 8,000 were killed, and perhaps 4,000 were killed in the first week at Malaga. A thousand were killed in the conquest of San Sebastian in the Basque Country, and another thousand at Bilbao. There were fourteen concentration camps in the area of Valencia alone, while Mussolini's son in law, Count Ciano, believed that there were 200 executions daily in conquered Madrid in the summer of 1939.
This cruelty was encouraged by an ideology that had a misogynist contempt for independent woman, and had a morbid support for "chastity" and "purity." But should also read Richard's chapters on autarky. Much of Franco's support came from smallholders, and Franco spoke of freeing Spain from the noxious influence of the cities. But in fact the peasants would be rendered powerless by Franco. Wheat production was lower in 1949 than at the end of the war, and what wheat did exist was guaranteed at high prices for rich producers, and subjected to speculation and the Black Market. Consumption of wheat fell by more than a quarter in the first decade of Falangist rule, as officials refused to upset their autarkic dreams by importing wheat to a country that could not feed itself. Indeed scarce food was shipped to Germany and Italy. While overcrowding and poverty increased, profits boomed and industrialists strengthened their privileges. All in all the first two decades to the New State were a total loss. A 1991 article by Giovanni Arrighi in the New Left Review demonstrates this. In the thirties Spain per capita wealth was about 40% of the European core. By 1959, Spain's wealth was less than 20%. Only after the economic boom did it rise again to pre civil war levels. In other words, a total waste.
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